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Does the Appointment of the Outside Director   






  We examine the stock market reaction to the announcement of outside director 
appointments in Taiwan. We employ a sample of 58 outside director announcements 
made by Taiwan Stock Exchange listed firms during the period 1 January, 1999 to 30 
June, 2003. Using this data, we can test some important hypotheses regarding the role 
of outside directors in conjunction with other conditions for corporate performance in 
affecting the stock market reactions.    Our empirical findings indicate that there exists 
a significantly positive reaction to the announcements. The cumulative abnormal 
returns ---one indicator of stock market reaction measured by using the methodology 
of market model based event study --- reached 4.776%. We also find that the 
abnormal returns are positive and higher with respect to each of the following 
characteristics: poorer prior corporate performance, the CEO as chairman of the board, 
larger free cash flow and a higher degree of information asymmetry. Further, we find 
that the announcement effect is decreasing as number of outside directors increases. 
Our findings are different from existing literature, for instance, those of Lin, Pope and 
Young (2003) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) mainly because the outside director 
appointment is not mandatory in Taiwan. This suggests that the announcement effects 
could be different across countries. The appointment appears to be more beneficial for 
a country with poor corporate governance mechanisms. 
JEL classification: G34 
 
Keywords: Outside director; Corporate governance; Information asymmetry; Agency 
problem 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to examine rigorously some relevant 
hypotheses regarding the role of outside directors in light of recent theoretical 
developments in corporate governance literature. We use new data from Taiwan to test 
some key hypotheses flowing from theory. 
Despite outside directors being monitors of management and providers of 
relevant complementary knowledge [e.g., Fama and Jensen (1983) and Fama (1980)], 
recent empirical findings indicate that the stock market reaction to the announcement 
of the appointment of an outside director is economically insignificant. Lin, Pope and 
Young (2003), for example, found that the market reaction was insignificant based on 
a sample of 714 appointment announcements made by UK firms. Rosenstein and 
Wyatt (1990), employing 1251 outside director announcements of US firms, found 
significant positive excess returns with respect to the announcements but with only 
0.13% cumulative abnormal returns. Explanations of the above empirical findings 
include the outside directors’ lack of time, expertise and performance incentives [Lin, 
Pope and Young (2003)]. 
Our objective is to examine the stock market reaction to the announcement of 
outside director appointments in Taiwan. Unlike the US and UK, the appointment of 
the outside director is not mandatory in Taiwan, except for those firms under 
securities listings review by the Taiwan Stock Exchange
1 (hereafter TSE). The 
majority of TSE listed firms have no outside directors on their boards. The 
announcement of an outside director appointment is unusual in Taiwan. This suggests 
that the announcement of such appointments is not anticipated by most of the market 
participants. In addition, compared to US and UK firms, Taiwanese firms, on average, 
have greater agency problems. This is because fewer corporate governance 
mechanisms exist in Taiwan. Lin, Pope and Young (2003) pointed out that the 
monitoring value of outside directors is conditional on the extent of the firm’s agency 
problems. The greater the firm’s agency problems, the more beneficial outside 
directors are likely to be. Therefore, shareholders of Taiwanese firms may benefit 
more from an outside director appointment. Furthermore, it is plausible to conjecture 
that, within a firm, the marginal value of the outside director decreases as the number 
of outside directors increases. In US and UK firms, there are many outside directors 
on the board. Recently, both NYSE
2 and  NASDAQ
3  required that at least 50% of the 
                                                 
1  See Article 9 of Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation Criteria for Review of Securities Listings. 
2  “Proposed Corporate Governance Listing Requirement form the New York Stock Exchange and 
Nasdaq,” Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, June 6,2002. 
3  “Press Release – Nasdaq Takes New Actions on Corporate Governance Reform (July 25,2002),” 
visited on August 15,2002,available at 
http://www.nasdaqnews.com/news/pr2002/ne_section02_141.html   3
board members be outside directors. Hence, the addition of a new outside director 
may not significantly increase the firm’s value. However, most Taiwanese firms have 
only one or no outside director. The announcement of an outside director may 
therefore have significant impact on shareholders leading to an appreciation of stock 
prices. 
  In addition to the wealth effect of the announcement, we also studied the 
relationship between the firms’ characteristics and the announcement effects. Lin, 
Pope and Young (2003) found that share prices respond more favorably to an outside 
director appointment announcement when board ownership is low. Extending their 
work, we examined the extent of the announcement effect with respect to firm 
characteristics including corporate performance, number of outside directors, the CEO 
as chairman of the board, free cash flow, degree of information asymmetry, and 
institutional investor ownership. 
  We expect that the appointment will be more beneficial for a firm with poor prior 
performance. This is because an outsider-dominant board is more likely to remove the 
poor performing managers [See, for example, Weisbach (1988)], and managers of 
poor performing firms will have stronger incentives to enhance corporate performance 
to avoid being removed. In addition, we believe that the announcement effect is 
negatively related to the number of outside directors due to decreasing marginal utility 
of outside directors. That is, the first appointment announcement has the most 
significant impact on the firm value (for example, in the case of Taiwan), but the 
impact of subsequent appointments is much smaller if a large number of the board 
members are outsiders (for example, in the US and UK). Further, Jensen (1993) points 
out that the monitoring value declines and agency costs increase if the chairman holds 
the position of CEO. Therefore, outsider monitoring ability is more important and 
beneficial for such firms and the announcement effect is expected to be better. 
  Jensen (1986) finds that firms with more free cash flow are associated with more 
severe overinvestment agency problems. Therefore, we hypothesize that the 
announcement of an outside director is likely to be more beneficial for a firm with 
relatively more free cash flow. This is because outsider monitoring could reduce the 
overinvestment agency costs. We also hypothesize that a company with higher 
information asymmetry is likely to benefit more from the announcement. This is 
because outside investors have relatively more difficulty monitoring the managers of 
such firms because of information asymmetry. The outside directors’ monitoring helps 
investors reduce the potential agency costs resulting from such high information 
asymmetry. Finally, Pound (1988) suggests that higher agency costs are associated 
with lower institutional investor ownership. Hence, we expect that companies with 
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lower institutional investor ownership are likely to benefit more from an outside 
director announcement.   
Our empirical findings indicate that a statistically and causally significant 
positive reaction occurs to the announcement of an outside director. The cumulative 
abnormal returns from such an announcement reach 4.776%. We also find that the 
abnormal returns are positive and higher with respect to each of the following 
characteristics: smaller number of outside directors, poorer corporate performance, 
the CEO as chairman of the board, larger free cash flow, and higher degree of 
information asymmetry. 
  This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the role of outside 
directors in corporate governance. Section 3 details the data and methodology. Results 
are presented in Section 4. Section 5 concludes this paper.     
 
2. The role of outside directors for corporate governance 
 
   Many agency theories claim that the outside directors, who can monitor the top 
management more effectively than other directors, and can also provide relevant 
expertise, should be an important element of corporate governance. Jensen (1993), 
Fama and Jensen (1983), Fama (1980), Connors (1989) and Baysinger and 
Hoskisson (1990), for example, document that outsider-dominated boards are more 
likely to oversee top management effectively due to outside directors’ expertise, 
independence and objectivity in evaluating the managers’ decisions. Consistent with 
this view, Weisbach（1988）and Huson et al. (2001) present that inside directors’ 
careers are tied to the CEO’s and hence generally insiders are unable or unwilling to 
monitor top management. For this reason, boards comprised of a higher proportion 
of outside representatives are more likely to enhance firm value. Weisbach (1988), 
further, points that, the CEO with poor performance is more likely to be removed by 
an outsider-dominated board. This also indicates that outsiders are better monitors 
for management.
4 
    One key factor that enables outside representatives to reduce agency costs is 
outsider expertise. Bacon (1973) found that 41% of outsiders were lawyers, bankers, 
investment specialists or consultants. Eisenberg (1975) also argued that, due to 
outsider expertise, a board could perform its duty more effectively if the majority of 
board members were outsiders. Moreover, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990 and 1997) 
                                                 
4  However, Khan( 1999, 2005) presents a more nuanced theoretical position on corporate governance 
in Asia in general and on the role of the board including outsiders in particular. The effect of the board 
is path dependent and initial conditions are important. See also Khan (1997, 1998) for a discussion of 
corporate performance in South Korea and Khan(2004a, b) for both South Korea and Taiwan. 
Khan(2004b) chapter 6 presents an extension of the principal-agent theory of corporate governance to 
account for the East Asian corporate behavior.   5
indicated that, as outside board members are providers of relevant knowledge, the 
announcement of the appointment of an outside director could enhance firm value 
more than inside directors. Perry and Shivdasani (2001) found that, after a period of 
poor firm performance, an outsider-dominated board would be more willing and able 
to propose a restructuring project, and this project would more likely be successful in 
the outsider-dominated firm.   
   In addition, a variety of studies indicate that board independence is associated 
with monitoring the financial accounting process. Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) 
report, for instance, that firms with large independent boards are associated with a 
lower debt financing cost, suggesting that outsider independence is an important 
element affecting the reliability of financial reports. Similarly, Klein (2002) finds 
that board independence is negatively related to earnings management by the firm, 
indicating that outsider-dominated boards are more effective in monitoring the 
corporate financial accounting process. Furthermore, Beasley (1996) and Uzun, 
Szewczyk and Varma (2004) note that a firm with a larger proportion of independent 
directors on the board is more likely to avoid financial statement fraud.   
   In contrast to the above views, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Mangel and 
Singh (1993) reveal that, due to top management’s control of the board-selection 
process, there is no relationship between board composition and performance. Singh 
and Davidson (2003) indicate that outside directors do not significantly reduce the 
agency problem. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) claim to have found that outside 
board members have negative impact on firm value. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
 
3.1. Data 
  We employed a sample of 58 outside director announcements made by TSE 
listed firms during the period 1 January, 1999 to 30 June, 2003. All data were obtained 
from the Taiwan Economic Journal Data Bank (TEJDB). TEJDB contains information 
on stock prices, trading volume and financial statements. The announcement date is 
the date of the first appearance of the announcement in either the Commercial Times 
or Economic Daily. The sample size
5  was not as large as that used by Rosenstein and 
Wyatt (1990) and Lin, Pope and Young (2003). This is because the outside director 
appointment is not mandatory in Taiwan. Most TSE listed firms have no outside 
director at all. This difference in legal environment provides an opportunity to 
examine whether the appointment announcement effect is different across countries 
                                                 
 
5  However, for the statistical analysis we carry out there are still sufficient degrees of freedom in 
estimation of key parameters.   6
and legal environments. 
  Table 1 presents the sample distribution with respect to industry and year. It 
shows that the number of outside director appointments has increased over time. The 
electronics industry has the most outside director appointments. This is because the 
electronics industry is the largest and the most internationalized industry in Taiwan. 
Pressure from international institutional shareholders has forced these firms to appoint 
outside directors. 
    
Table 1 
Sample distribution with respect to industry and year 
Industry 1999  2000  2001 2002 2003 Total  Percentage
Plastic     1  1  2  3.45% 
Textile         1  1 1.72% 
Machinery  1  2 1 1 2 7  12.07% 
Power Cable    1        1  1.72% 
Chemicals         1  1  1.72% 
Rubber         1  1 1.72% 
Electronic       12  27  39 67.24% 
Finance         4  4 6.90% 
Others    1    1  2  3.45% 
Total 1 4  2  14 37 58  100% 
 
 
The variable descriptive statistics are described in table 2. The prior stock 
performance is measured by the cumulative abnormal returns from day –150 to 
day –31 (hereafter, PSP) and relative return on equity (hereafter, ROE). PSP ranges 
widely from -49.6% to 217.3% and ROE ranges from -38.03% to 33.26%. This wide 
PSP and ROE distribution provides a good opportunity to examine the relationship 
between corporate performance and outside director announcement effects. We also 
observed that most firms in our sample had no outside director before the appointment 
announcement. The maximum number is just 2. On average, there are only 0.19 
outside directors in each firm. This indicates that the average number of outside 
directors for TSE listed firms is much smaller than that in some other stock markets 
such as the US, UK, Hong Kong and South Korea. For a stock exchange with over 
400 billion US dollars market value, the outside director mechanism in Taiwan is still 
in its infancy. In addition, the table tells that 19% of sample firms’ CEOs are also 
chairmen of their boards, and the average institutional shareholder ownership is 
38.36%. 
 
Table 2   7
Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Med Std  Min  Max
Operating performance：         
  Prior Stock Performance (PSP)  0.074 -0.010 0.435 -0.496  2.173
  Returns on equity (ROE)  5.696 5.635 13.094  -38.030  33.260
Original board structure：        
  Existence of outside director (ODD)  0.121 0  0.329  0  1 
  Number of outside directors (ODN)  0.190 0  0.545  0  2 
  Ratio of number of outside directors to total board 
members (ODR) 
2.090 0 6.089 0  28.571
The CEO as chairman of board (CEO)  0.190 0  0.395  0  1 
Free cash flow (FCF)  0.090 0.093 0.119  -0.352  0.376
Information asymmetry：        
  Research and development expenditures (RD)  4.496 5.089 2.126  0  7.306
  Firm age (EST)  7038.776 6519.5 3970.829  343  16914
  Length of time of firm’s listing (LIS)  1967.862 1180 2255.416  264  11963
  Degree of diversification (DIV)  0.956 0.999 0.081  0.668  1 
Institutional shareholder ownership (INT)  38.356 36.3 22.165  0  97.39
Ratio of equity book value to equity market value (BM)  0.766 0.638 0.489  0.173  2.850




3.2.1. Event Study 
  The market model based event study was used to calculate the abnormal returns. 
The window length was 30 days before and after the announcement day. The 
estimated period is from day -150 to day -31. 
  We first calculated the expected returns, 
∧
it R , using the following market model: 
it mt i i it e R R + + =
∧ ∧ ∧
β α  
where  mt R   is the return of the market portfolio on day  t; 
∧
i α  and 
∧
i β  are  estimates 
of parameters  i α  and  i β .The abnormal return,  it AR , is the difference between the 
real return and the expected return. Second, we calculate the cumulative abnormal 
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3.2.2. Firm characteristics and announcement effects 
We then examined the relationship between the cumulative abnormal returns and 
firms’ characteristics, including corporate performance, number of outside directors, 
the CEO as chairman of the board, free cash flow, degree of information asymmetry, 
and institutional investor ownership. Two control variables, the ratio of book value to 
market value of equity and the firm size, are also included in the equation. The 
regression model is as follows: 
 
()
i i i i i
i i i i i
e SIZE BM INT IA
FCF CEO OD PER t t CAR
+ + + + +
+ + + + =
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 2 1,
β β β β
β β β β α
 
 
where  () 2 1,t t CARi  is the cumulative abnormal returns from  1 t to 2 t of firm i;  i PER  
is the corporate performance of firm i;  i OD   is the board composition of firm i before 
announcement;  i CEO  is a dummy variable indicating whether the CEO also held  
chairman of the board.  i FCF  is the free cash flow of firm i.  i IA  is the degree of 
information asymmetry in firm i.  i INT  is the institutional shareholder percent 
ownership of firm i.  i BM   is the ratio of book equity value to market equity value of 
firm i.  i SIZE   is the size of firm i. 
We employed PSP and ROE as proxy for  i PER . PSP is the cumulative abnormal 
returns from day –150 to day –30. ROE is the difference between firm’s return on 
equity and industry’s return on equity of the year prior to the announcement. 
In addition, we used ODD, ODN and ODR to proxy for i OD . ODD is a dummy 
variable that equals one if outside directors existed on the board prior to the 
announcement. Otherwise, it is zero. ODN is the number of outside directors prior to 
the announcement. ODR is the ratio of number of outside directors to total board 
members before the announcement.  i CEO  is a dummy variable. It equals one when 
the CEO holds the position of chairman of the board. Otherwise, it is zero. 




i ip i i i
i E
D D TAX I INC
FCF
− − − −
=  
where  i FCF  is the free cash flow of firm i.  i INC  is the operating income before 
depreciation of firm i.  i I  is the interest expense of firm i.  i TAX  is the income tax 
of firm i.  ip D  is the cash dividends from the preferred stocks of firm i.  i D  is the 
cash dividends from the  common stocks of firm i.  i E  is the book equity value of 
firm i. 
  We employed RD, EST, LIS and DIV as the proxy for i IA . RD is the logarithm for 
the firm’s 3-year research and development expenditures prior to the announcement.   9
More R&D expenditures imply higher degree of information asymmetry. EST is the 
age of the firm. Datta et al.（2000）pointed out that greater firm age is associated with 
a lower degree of information asymmetry. LIS is the length of time of a firm’s listing 
on the stock market. Similarly, a longer time period implies a lower degree of 
information asymmetry. DIV is the degree of diversification. DIV is measured by the 
value of the major operating income divided by the total income for the month prior 
to the announcement. A larger DIV means smaller degree of diversification, that is, a 
lower degree of information asymmetry. 
  INT is the institutional investor ownership percent at the end of the month prior 
to the announcement. BM is the ratio of book equity value to the market equity value 
of end of the quarter prior to the announcement. Size is the logarithm of the market 
equity value at the end of the quarter prior to the announcement. 
 
3.2.3. Interaction analysis 
We expected that the appointment would be more beneficial for a firm with 
greater agency problems and poorer corporate performance. This is because, from the 
investor viewpoint, the expertise and monitoring ability of outside directors enhances 
firm performance and reduces the agency problem. To examine such an interaction 
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β β β α
 
where  i PERD  is the dummy variable of corporate performance for firm i. We 
used PSPD and ROED to proxy for  i PERD . The PSPD value was determined using 
firm’s stock return. We ranked our sample firms using their prior stock performance 
PSP. PSPD equals 1 if the firm’s rank was in the lower 50%. Otherwise it equals 0. 
Similarly, ROED equals 1 when a firm’s relative return on equity ranks in the lower 
50%; otherwise it equals 0. In addition, greater agency problems are presented by 
more free cash flow, higher degree of information asymmetry, lower institutional 
investor ownership, the CEO as chairman of the board, and a smaller number of 
outside directors on the board.   
 
 
4. Empirical findings 
  This section presents our empirical results. We first examine the stock market 
reaction to the announcement of outside director appointments. We then investigate   10
the relationship between firm characteristics and their announcement effects. Finally, 
we study the impact of the interaction between agency problems and corporate 
performance on the announcement effects. 
 
4.1. The stock market reaction to the announcement of outside director appointments 
  Although there are a great number of studies related to outside directors, only a 
few of them have  examined the announcement effect. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) 
found significant positive excess returns with respect to outside director 
announcements on US firms. However, the cumulative abnormal returns are only 
0.13%. Lin, Pope and Young (2003) found that the market reaction was insignificant 
based on the announcements made by UK firms. Can the appointment of an outside 
director increase firm value? We doubt that the announcement effect is 
underestimated. Since the outside director mechanism has prevailed in both the US 
and UK for a long period of time, a great number of outside directors are present on 
US and UK boards. The addition of a new appointment does not increase a firm value 
significantly due to decreasing marginal utility. To realize the original or real effect of 
the appointment, it is important to study the announcement effect when an outside 
director appointment is still rare on the board. In this paper, we examine the 
announcement effect of TSE listed firms. We expect that the market reaction would be 
positive. This is because an outside director appointment is not mandatory in Taiwan. 
Most firms have no or only one outside director. The original benefits brought by the 
outside director may be revealed. 
 
Table 3 
Cumulative abnormal returns of announcement of outside director appointments 
Windows CAR  t(CAR) 
(-1~+1) 0.394  0.714 
(-10~+10) 2.639  1.807* 
(-15~+15) 3.320  1.872* 
(-30~+30) 4.776  1.919* 
(0~+30) 0.439  0.247 
(-30~0) 4.225 2.382** 
*significant at 10% level    **significant at 5% level    ***significant at 1% level 
 
 
Table 3 presents that cumulative abnormal returns for all six windows are 
positive, CAR (-30,+30) reaching 4.776%. This indicates that the stock market 
positively responds to outside director announcements. Figure 1 describes the 
abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns from day –30 to day 30. The 





















that an outside director’s monitoring ability and expertise increases firm value. This is 




Figure 1  Announcement effect of appointment of outside director 
 
 
Different from Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) and Lin, Pope and Young (2003), 
our empirical findings are significant both economically and statistically. This is 
consistent with our hypothesis that outside appointment marginal utility for the firm 
decreases as more appointments are made and the announcement effect can vary 
across countries depending on initial conditions. In our sample, most announcements 
are the firms’ first outside director appointment. The findings indicate that the original 
effect of the appointment is positive and significant. Outsiders’ expertise and 
monitoring increases firm value. In addition, the appointment is more beneficial for a 
country with greater agency problems like Taiwan.   
 
4.2. The relationship between the announcement effect and characteristics of a firm 
  Some studies find that the extent of the announcement effect is different across 
firms due to their differences in characteristics. Lin, Pope and Young (2003), for 
instance, find that share prices respond more favorably to appointment announcement 
when board ownership is low. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) indicated that the 
announcement effect is associated with the outside board members’ occupations.   12
Extending their works, we further examined the relationship between the 
announcement and firm characteristics.   
Six characteristics were chosen including corporate performance, number of 
outside directors, the CEO as chairman of the board, free cash flow, degree of 
information asymmetry, and institutional investor ownership. Corporate performance 
is a good variable to examine whether outsiders’ monitoring ability and expertise are 
beneficial for the firm. We expected that the stock price would respond more 
favorably to the announcement when the firms’ performance is poor. This is because a 
poor performing firm benefits more from an outsiders’ expertise. A board with outside 
directors is more likely to remove poor performing managers. The second 
characteristic, number of outside directors, is a good indicator to examine whether the 
marginal benefit of the outside director is decreasing. The rest of the characteristics 
are related to agency problems. Lin, Pope and Young (2003) stated that the greater the 
firms’ agency problems, the more beneficial outside directors would likely be. Since 
greater agency problems are associated with more free cash flow, higher degree of 
information asymmetry, lower institutional investor ownership, and CEO as chairman 
of the board, we predict that such firms will benefit more from the appointment.   
  Table 4 shows that the PSP coefficient is significantly negative. This means that 
poorer corporate performance will benefit more from the appointment. The result 
could be because investors expect outsiders with monitoring ability and expertise to 
remove poor performing managers and give advice to management. The value of a 
poor performing firm may increase significantly after an outside director appointment. 
We also observed that when the CEO held the position of chairman of the board, the 
market reaction to the announcement was positive. This is because such firms have 
greater agency problems. The independence and objectivity of the board declines 
when the board chairman is CEO. Monitoring the managers is less effective. The 
introduction of a new outside director can increase the monitoring power and, hence, 
reduce the agency problem under such initial conditions.     
In (4) of table 4, FCF is significantly and positively related to CAR. This is 
consistent with Jensen (1986) that more free cash flows create greater agency 
problems due to overinvestment problems. Outside director expertise and monitoring 






Firm characteristics and their announcement effects CAR(0, +30) 
This table presents the relationship between firms’ characteristics and their announcement effects. 
The regression model is as follows:   13
 
()
i i i i i
i i i i i
e SIZE BM INT IA
FCF CEO OD PER CAR
+ + + + +
+ + + + = +
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 30 , 0
β β β β
β β β β α
 
 
where CAR(0, +30) is the cumulative abnormal returns from day 0 to day +30; PER is the corporate 
performance; OD is the board composition before announcement; CEO is a dummy variable indicating 
whether CEO also holds the position of chairman of the board; FCF is free cash flow; IA is degree of 
information asymmetry; INT is institutional shareholder ownership; BM is the ratio of book equity 
value to market equity value; SIZE is the firm size. 
 
Dependent variable: CAR(0,+30) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  -43.866  (-3.156)***  -36.929 (-2.627)** -13.933 (-0.549) -54.044  (-3.497)***
PSP -16.048  (-3.578)***  -16.005 (-3.363)*** -16.426 (-3.528)***   
ROE             -0.106  (-0.504)
ODD -6.988  (-1.199)  -2.867 (-0.494)     -5.939  (-0.911)
ODN        -0.388 (-0.110)     
CEO 10.175  (2.102)**  10.194 (2.026)** 10.512 (2.081)** 10.940  (2.000)*
FCF 24.684  (1.312)  18.773 (0.955)  18.828 (0.966)  54.778  (2.443)**
RD     0.737  (0.794)       
LIS -0.002  (-2.131)**       -0.002  (-2.222)**
DIV       -21.516 (-0.933)    
INT  0.019 (0.188) 0.034 (0.328) 0.018  (0.179)  0.048 (0.435) 
BM 12.956  (2.533)**  9.361  (1.886)* 8.321 (1.672)  18.395  (3.315)***
SIZE 9.130  (2.872)***  6.057  (2.003)** 6.566  (2.148)** 9.647  (2.684)**
Adj R
2 0.333    0.281    0.280  0.163  
Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. PSP and ROE are proxy for PER；ODD and ODN are proxy for 
OD; RD, LIS and DIV are proxy for IA. 
*significant at 10% level    **significant at 5% level    ***significant at 1% level 
  
  LIS is proxy for the degree of information asymmetry. Smaller LIS indicates 
higher degree of information asymmetry. The coefficient of LIS is significantly and 
negatively related to CAR. This result implies that the appointment is more beneficial 
for a firm with higher degree of information asymmetry. This could be because 
outside investors have difficulties overseeing a firm with higher information 
asymmetry. The outside director, who is considered to be more independent than other 
board members, can help investors to monitor the management and reduce the agency 
problem.     
  The coefficient of the control variable BM is significant and positive. This is 
consistent with the observation by Fama and French (1992) that BM ratio is positively 
related to stock returns. The coefficient of another control variable, SIZE, is also 
positive and significant. We interpret this result as revealing that a larger firm will   14
have a greater agency problem due to the more dispersed ownership structure. 
Therefore, the appointment of an outside director is more beneficial for a larger firm. 
  
Table 5 
Firm characteristics and their announcement effects CAR(-30, +30) 
This table presents the relationship between firms’ characteristics and their announcement effects. 
The regression model is as follows: 
 
()
i i i i i
i i i i i
e SIZE BM INT IA
FCF CEO OD PER CAR
+ + + + +
+ + + + = + −
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1 30 , 30
β β β β
β β β β α
 
 
where CAR(-30, +30) is the cumulative abnormal returns from day -30 to day +30; PER is the 
corporate performance;  OD is the board composition before announcement; CEO is a dummy 
variable indicating whether CEO also holds the position of chairman of the board; FCF is free cash 
flow; IA is degree of information asymmetry; INT is institutional shareholder ownership; BM is the 
ratio of book equity value to market equity value; SIZE is the firm size. 
 
Dependent variable: CAR(-30,+30) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept -31.943  (-1.547)  -1.975 (-0.095) -2.035  (-0.097)  -57.372  (-2.141)**
PSP -38.309  (-5.749)***  -40.151 (-6.002)*** -40.298 (-5.956)*** -0.296 (-0.825)
ODD -19.495  (-2.252)**  -20.339 (-2.287)**      
ODN          -9.832  (-1.438)
ODR       -0.987  (-2.049)**   
CEO 13.276  (1.846)*  11.609 (1.592) 12.899 (1.746)*  16.027  (1.704)*
FCF 15.824  (0.566)  13.765 (0.490) 11.162  (0.395)  89.257  (2.311)**
EST     -0.002 (-2.220)** -0.002  (-2.123)**   
LIS -0.003  (-2.375)**         -0.004  (-2.292)**
INT  -0.049 (-0.334) -0.042 (-0.281) -0.055  (-0.366)  0.020  (0.105)
BM 10.641  (1.400)  5.006  (0.704)  5.005  (0.696)  23.964  (2.495)**
SIZE 9.821  (2.080)**  4.573 (1.055) 4.518  (1.031) 11.254  (1.809)*
Adj R
2 0.446  0.439  0.428    0.078  
Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. PSP are proxy for PER；ODD, ODN and ODR are proxy for 
OD; EST and LIS are proxy for IA. 
*significant at 10% level    **significant at 5% level    ***significant at 1% level 
 
Table 5 shows the regression analysis results with the dependent variable, CAR 
(-30,+30). CAR (-30,+30) is chosen as the dependent variable because, in table 3, 
CAR(-30,+30) is the largest among all 6 values. We observe that the coefficients of 
both ODD and ODR are significantly negative. ODD is a dummy variable that equals 
one if outside directors existed on the board prior to the announcement. Otherwise, it 
is zero. ODR is the ratio of the number of outside directors to the total number of 
board members before the announcement. The negative ODD and ODR coefficients 
indicate that the value of an additional outside director decreases as the total number   15
of outside director increases. This, again, is consistent with our thought that the 
marginal utility of appointment decreases as the number of outside director increases. 
The rest of the findings are similar to those in Table 4. 
  To summarize the findings of Table 4 and Table 5, the announcement effects are 
indeed  causally related in various ways indicated above to firm performance, 
original board structure, the CEO as chairman of board, free cash flow, and degree of 
information asymmetry. 
 
4.3. The interaction between corporate performance and agency problems 
  We also examine the impact of interaction between corporate performance and 
agency problems on the announcement. We expect that a poor performing firm with 
higher agency cost benefits more from the outside director appointment. This is 
because outside directors’ expertise and monitoring reduce the agency problem and 
enhance corporate performance. Our variables related to agency costs include board 
structure, CEO as chairman of the board, free cash flow, degree of information 
asymmetry and the institutional shareholder ownership. 
  The proxy for corporate performance contains PSP and ROE. For convenience of 
examining the interaction effect, we also employed two dummy variables, PSPD and 
ROED, to proxy for corporate performance. We rank our sample firms by their PSP. 
PSPD equals 1 if the firm’s rank is in the lower 50%. Otherwise it equals 0. Similarly, 
ROED equals 1 when a firm’s relative return on equity ranks in the lower 50%. 
Otherwise it equals 1.         
In Table 6, the coefficient of PSP is significantly negative. This indicates that the 
announcement is beneficial for the poor performance firm.   
As to the interaction effect, PSPD*ODR is negatively related to CAR, which 
implies that a poor performing firm with low outside director rate benefits much more 
from outsiders’ monitoring and advice. In addition, the PSPD*RD is positively and 
significantly related to CAR. RD is the research and development expenditure proxy 
for information asymmetry. Larger RD indicates higher degree of information 
asymmetry. The positive coefficient of PSPD*RD states that the appointment is 
beneficial for a poor performing firm with high degree of information asymmetry. 
This implies that investors desperately need an outside directors’ help to monitor the 
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where CAR(-30, +30) is the cumulative abnormal returns from day -30 to day +30; PSP is the 
cumulative abnormal returns from day –150 to day –30; OD is the board composition before 
announcement; CEO is a dummy variable indicating whether CEO also holds the position of chairman 
of the board; FCF is free cash flow; IA is degree of information asymmetry; INT is institutional 
shareholder ownership; BM is the ratio of book equity value to market equity value; SIZE is the firm 
size; The value of PSPD is determined by firm’s stock return. We rank our sample firms by their prior 
stock performance PSP. PSPD equals 1 if the firm’s rank is in the lower 50%. Otherwise it equals 0. 
 
Dependent variable: CAR(-30,+30) 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Intercept -6.636  (-0.346) -6.554 (-0.342) 21.163  (0.885) 
PSP -31.553    (-3.831)*** -31.522    (-3.826)*** -3.668 (-0.362) 
PSPD*ODD     -7.868 (-0.767)     
PSPD*ODN -4.496  (-0.779)         
PSPD*ODR       -1.214  (-1.935)* 
PSPD*CEO  11.585 (1.051) 11.165 (1.020)  19.861  (1.440) 
PSPD*FCF  -57.472 (-1.395) -56.340 (-1.361) 59.458  (1.187) 
PSPD*RD 3.099  (1.728)*  3.080  (1.714)*    
PSPD*DIV       -0.090  (-0.007) 
PSPD*INT -0.033  (-0.189) -0.029 (-0.166) -0.094  (-0.411) 
BM 0.285 (0.042) 0.126 (0.019) -1.142 (-0.137) 
SIZE 2.541 (0.616) 2.545 (0.616) -4.390 (-0.860) 
Adj R
2  0.396  0.395   0.062   
Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. PSP are proxy for PER；ODD, ODN and ODR are proxy for 
OD;RD, and DIV are proxy for IA.   
*significant at 10% level    **significant at 5% level    ***significant at 1% level 
 
Table 7 presents the interaction effect with the corporate performance proxy 
ROE. ROE is negatively related to CAR. This, again, indicates that the appointment is 
good for a poor performing firm.   
The coefficient of ROED*FCF is positive and significant. This implies that the 
announcement is beneficial for a poor performing firm with more free cash flow. The 
outside director can help shareholders to prevent the management from overinvesting 
in inapropriate projects, remove incompetent managers and supervise the management 
to enhance firm performance. In addition, we find that ROED*EST, ROED*LIS and 
ROED*DIV are all negatively related to CAR. EST, LIS and DIV are all proxy for 
information asymmetry. EST is age of the firm. Greater firm age is associated with 
lower degree of information asymmetry. LIS is the length of time of a firm’s listing on   17
the stock market. Similarly, longer time period implies lower degree of information 
asymmetry. DIV is degree of diversification. Larger DIV means smaller degree of 
diversification, that is, lower degree of information asymmetry. Negative coefficients 
of ROED*EST, ROED*LIS and ROED*DIV all imply that, again, the appointment is 
beneficial for a poor performing firm with a higher degree of information asymmetry. 
 
Table 7 
The interaction between corporate performance (ROED) and agency problems 
The impact of interaction between corporate performance and agency problems on the 
announcement effects is presented in this table. The regression model is as follows:   
()
i i i i i i
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SIZE BM INT ROED IA ROED
FCF ROED CEO ROED OD ROED ROE CAR
8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1
* *
* * * 30 ~ 30
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+ + + +
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where CAR(-30, +30) is the cumulative abnormal returns from day -30 to day +30; ROE is the 
difference between firm’s return on equity and industry’s return on equity of the year prior to the 
announcement; OD is the board composition before announcement; CEO is a dummy variable 
indicating whether CEO also holds the position of chairman of the board; FCF is free cash flow; IA is 
degree of information asymmetry; INT is institutional shareholder ownership; BM is the ratio of book 
equity value to market equity value; SIZE is the firm size; ROED equals 1 when a firm’s relative return 
on equity ranks in the lower 50%; otherwise it equals 0. 
Dependent variable: CAR(-30,+30) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept -7.620  (-0.317)  0.314 (0.013)  0.314 (0.013)  -36.895  (-1.492) 
ROE -0.341  (-0.972) -0.759 (-1.831)*  -0.759   (-1.831)* -0.286 (-0.817) 
ROED*ODD     -0.397 (-0.042)    -20.301  (-1.025) 
ROED*ODN         -0.397 (-0.042)     
ROED*ODR -1.179  (-1.204)           
ROED*CEO -16.569  (-0.892) -5.916 (-0.310)  -5.916 (-0.310) -15.534 (-0.831) 
ROED*FCF 98.664  (2.290)**  78.083 (1.843)*  78.083 (1.843)*  93.248   (2.164)**
ROED*EST -0.003   (-2.980)***           
ROED*LIS            -0.005   (-2.850)***
ROED*DIV     -42.315     (-2.866)*** -42.315   (-2.866)***    
ROED*INT  0.004 (0.018) 0.125 (0.525)  0.125 (0.525) -0.208  (-1.113) 
BM 18.331    (2.051)**  15.507 (1.768)*  15.507 (1.768)*  20.539  (2.216)**
SIZE  3.055 (0.586) 3.494 (0.668)  3.494 (0.668) 9.863  (1.823)* 
Adj R
2 0.109  0.098   0.098  0.097  
Numbers in parentheses are t statistics. ROE are proxy for PER；ODD, ODN and ODR are proxy for 
OD; EST, LIS and DIV are proxy for IA.   
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  Recent empirical findings indicate that the stock market reaction to outside 
director appointment announcements is economically insignificant. Lin, Pope and 
Young (2003), for example, find that the market reaction is insignificant based on a 
sample of UK firms. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), employing 1251 outside director 
announcements in US firms, find significant positive excess returns with respect to 
the announcements but with only 0.13% cumulative abnormal returns.   
  We conjecture that such empirical findings result from the decrease in marginal 
utility of outside directors to the firm among other important corporate governance 
related initial conditions. The outside director mechanism has prevailed in the US and 
UK for a long period of time. Most firms have many outside members on their boards. 
The addition of a new outsider may not significantly increase firm value.   
  However, in Taiwan, the appointment of an outside director is not mandatory. 
Most firms have no or only one outside director. The announcement of an outside 
director appointment can reflect the value of an outside director’s expertise and 
monitoring ability. We employ a sample of 58 outside director announcements made 
by TSE listed firms during the period 1 January, 1999 to 30 June, 2003. Our empirical 
findings indicate that a significantly positive reaction exists to the announcement. The 
cumulative abnormal returns reached 4.776% during the sampling period. We also 
found that the abnormal returns were positive and higher with respect to each of the 
following characteristics: poorer corporate performance, the CEO as chairman of the 
board, larger free cash flow, and higher degree of information asymmetry.   
  These findings indicate that the market expects an outside director to remove 
incompetent managers or advise management to enhance firm performance; increase 
board independence and objectivity when CEO holds the position of chairman of the 
board; ease the overinvestment problem when free cash flow is high; and reduce the 
agency problem associated with information asymmetry. Furthermore, we find that 
the announcement effect tends to decrease as number of outside director increases. 
  Our findings are different from those of Lin, Pope and Young (2003) and 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) mainly because the outside director appointment is not 
mandatory in Taiwan. This also suggests that the announcement effects could be 
different across countries as initial conditions may vary among them . The 
announcement effect seems to be causally associated with the corporate governance 
environment. The poorer the country’s initial corporate governance mechanism, the 
stronger the announcement effect is likely to be. 
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